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JUDICIAL SPECULATION ON CONSUMER
IMPRESSION: THE PITFALLS OF MEASURING
TRADEMARK TACKING AS A QUESTION OF LAW
Megan Majcher Hartnett+
Legal issues can arise in the courtroom from infinite variations of factual
circumstances. Convoluted sets of facts applied to existing law exacerbates a
court’s struggle to resolve legal issues. It is even more difficult for the court to
ascertain what is fact and what is law. As part of the judicial process, during a
jury trial the judge determines legal issues and is expected to keep factual
determinations to a minimum. However, judges often assume the burden of
sorting out the facts even when they should not. This issue impacts all aspects
of the legal profession, but it can be particularly relevant in trademark law.
“Tacking” is the further use of a trademark (or mark)1 when the old mark has
been altered and the owner continues to use the mark in its new form. 2
Trademark law permits mark owners to tack only in certain circumstances.3 The
proper test for determining when tacking should be permitted is whether the new
mark is a legal equivalent of the old mark.4 The court will assess the continuous
commercial impression of the mark to determine legal equivalency.5 Courts
often disagree about whether a continuous commercial impression, specifically
whether the mark has been substantially altered, is an issue of fact or an issue of
law.6
+
J.D. Candidate, May 2015, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.F.A. 2009, Cornish College of the Arts. The author would like to thank Professor Elizabeth I.
Winston for her guidance and feedback during the writing process and her colleagues on the
Catholic University Law Review for their hard work on this Comment. The author also wishes to
thank her incredible family for their love and support during the writing process and throughout
law school.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining “[t]he term ‘mark’ [to] include[] any trademark, service
mark, collective mark, or certification mark”).
2. See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th Cir.
1999) (noting that the mark’s author joins the earlier use of the mark and the later use of the mark
by “tacking” them together).
3. See id. (labeling the standard for tacking as “exceedingly strict”).
4. Louangel, Inc. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1809, 1812 (S.D. Tex.
2013). In cases where tacking is allowed, “[m]inor differences between marks, such as an
inconsequential modification or modernization, would serve as a basis for tacking, because a
consumer would consider the marks the same.” Specht v. Google Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d 570, 583
(N.D. Ill. 2010).
5. Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(quoting Ilco Corp. v. Ideal Sec. Hardware Corp., 527 F.2d 1221, 1224 (C.C.P.A. 1976)); see also
Louangel, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813 (noting that “the marks must be quite similar and convey
the same impression to the consumer” (emphasis added)).
6. Louangel, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812 (stating that there is a circuit split regarding the
issue, with the Ninth Circuit considering it a question of fact, whereas both the Federal Circuit and
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Businesses market their trademarks to large audiences, and so a mark’s
commercial impressions can be varied and diverse..7 Trademarks, and
advertisements generally, help the viewer identify the source of a corresponding
good or service.8 Viewers may respond differently to the same visual stimulus
depending on the viewer’s unique circumstance.9 Consequently, the courts need
to employ a legal standard that identifies a trademark’s commercial impression
using a fact-based inquiry that recognizes these intricacies.10
Trademark status protects “any word, name, symbol . . . or any combination
thereof” that is intended to identify the source of a good or service.11
the Sixth Circuit consider it a question of law). Additionally, courts have viewed the tacking test
as a question of fact, law, or a mixed question of both if the commercial impression of a mark has
substantially been altered. Id.; Gideon Mark & Jacob Jacoby, Continuing Commercial Impression:
Applications and Measurement, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 433, 448–49 (2006) (positing
that tacking is really a mixed question of law and fact).
7. See Mark & Jacoby, supra note 6, at 434–35. Commercial impression of a trademark is
essentially the message the mark relays to the viewer and how that person reacts to that message.
Id. Considering the numerous viewers of those marks, individual interpretation or commercial
impression can vary from one viewer to another. Id. Additionally:
Trademarks contribute to economic efficiency by reducing consumer search costs. A
consumer can look to trademarks as shorthand indicators of quality, prestige, or product
attributes. Producers benefit because they can invest in building goodwill with the
confidence that others will not appropriate it. Consumers benefit because trademarks
relieve the burden of having to do exhaustive research about a product’s features. While
marketers do not speak of trademarks per se, they attribute these same functions to
brands. Indeed, trademarks are essentially what marketers refer to as branding elements,
the most salient being the brand name.
Robert C. Bird & Joel H. Steckel, The Role of Consumer Surveys in Trademark Infringement:
Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1013, 1019–20 (2012) (footnotes
omitted).
8. See BERND SCHMITT & ALEX SIMONSON, MARKETING AESTHETICS 85 (1997)
(explaining the function of differing style choices for marketers, in that images “create brand
awareness; they cause intellectual and emotional associations. They differentiate products and
services; they help consumers categorize products and services as being related”).
9. See, e.g., RAY CROZIER, MANUFACTURED PLEASURES: PSYCHOLOGICAL RESPONSES TO
DESIGN 68–69 (1994) (explaining that generational differences may be the reason for differing
reactions to images).
10. See MARCEL DANESI, WHY IT SELLS: DECODING THE MEANINGS OF BRAND NAMES,
LOGOS, ADS, AND OTHER MARKETING AND ADVERTISING PLOYS 77 (2008) (stating how German
philosopher Ernst Cassirer explained that humans are “a symbolic species—a species that responds
to symbolism emotionally, aesthetically, and intellectually”).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). Under federal law a trademark:
[I]ncludes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof— (1) used by
a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies
to register on the principal register established by this chapter, to identify and distinguish
his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others
and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.
Id. Some trademarks may be more successful depending on how they tap into the “psychological
function of symbols” as the purpose of trademarks depend on visual and aural cues, or, essentially,
“a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been
led to believe he wants.” Elizabeth Cutter Bannon, Revisiting “The Rational Basis of Trademark
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Trademarks are, by nature, visual or aural signals that prompt consumers to
identify the source of products and services.12 Marks range from simple designs
to more artistic images.13 The strength of trademark protection may correlate
with both the complexity of the design and the leap consumers make to associate
the mark with a good or service.14
Tacking is used to further the life of the trademark when the mark has been
altered slightly.15 Trademark law permits owners to modify their marks in
response to changes in the marketplace.16 Businesses often alter their marks to
more accurately represent consumers’ market preferences and general style
trends.17 Because trademark protection is derived from distinctive use in the
Protection:” Control of Quality and Dilution-Estranged Bedfellows?, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 65,
88 n.194 (1990) (quoting Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S.
203, 205 (1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
3:1 (4th ed. 2013). Sound marks have been established as legitimate trademarks, but “sound marks
must be inherently distinctive or have acquired distinctiveness to be registered.” Melissa E. Roth,
Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: A New Tradition in
Nontraditional Trademark Registrations, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 457, 485 (2005). Well-known
examples of sounds marks are the NBC chimes or the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer lion’s roar. Id.
Trademarks may also extend to the trade dress of a brand, a “term [that] has grown to include the
shape and appearance of a product as well as that of all the elements making up the total visual
image by which the product is presented to consumers.” See SCHMITT & SIMONSON, supra note 8,
at 223.
13. Quiksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749, 760 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting the spectrum
of marks). Specifically, the Ninth Circuit placed trademarks into five categories:
“(1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; and (5) fanciful.” At one end
of the spectrum, generic marks “give the general name of the product; they embrace an
entire class of products.” “Generic marks are not capable of receiving protection because
they identify the product, rather than the product’s source.” At the other end of the
spectrum, suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks are “deemed inherently distinctive
and are automatically entitled to protection because they naturally serve to identify a
particular source of a product.”
Id. (quoting Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925, 927
(9th Cir. 2005)).
14. See id. (discussing the relationship between the classification of a mark and the protection
that classification affords the mark).
15. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 17:26, at 17-63 to -64.
16. See SCHMITT & SIMONSON, supra note 8, at 110–11 (discussing the influence of customer
feedback on a company’s style). Often advertisers will rely on updates to their “look” in order to
attract the attention of a waning consumer base. CROZIER, supra note 9, at 67–68 (suggesting that
fashion designers alter their signature styles to adapt to changing times). The more radical the
change, the more likely the design will stand apart from others in the marketplace, and therefore a
higher likelihood exists that the design will grab consumer attention. See SCHMITT & SIMONSON,
supra note 8, at 110–11.
17. See Mark & Jacoby, supra note 6, at 435 (citing Betty Crocker’s image as an example of
long-term, relatively frequent tacking). General Mills created the character of Betty Crocker in
1921 and, due to popularity in the fictional character, they decided to depict her likeness. The
History of Betty Crocker, GEN. MILLS, http://generalmills.com/~/media/Files/history/hist_
betty.ashx (last visited Aug. 14, 2014). Since 1936, when Betty Crocker’s image first debuted, the
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marketplace, protection is potentially endless.18 If trademark law prohibited a
mark’s owner from updating the image to adapt to popular aesthetic
developments, the mark could become stagnant.19 Once this occurs, an owner
may be forced to create a new mark and abandon the old mark, which will result
in the owner losing trademark law’s continued protection.20 Additionally, by
allowing a mark’s owner to continue using an existing mark, the trademark
remains protected “from appropriation by competitors and thus furthers the
trademark law’s objective of reducing the costs that customers incur in shopping
and making purchasing decisions.”21 Thus, tacking plays a constructive role in
long-term trademark protection and use.
Tacking an old mark to a newer mark, requires the two marks to be “legal
equivalents,” and the newer mark must not deviate substantially in form from
the older version.22 Whether a mark deviates substantially is determined by
whether the newer mark creates “the same, continuing commercial
impression.”23 However, courts disagree as to whether “continuing commercial
impression” should be measured as a question of law or a question of fact.24
Some courts determine whether tacking is an issue of law or fact based on
how they have determined similar trademark issues, such as the test for
“likelihood of confusion” (the “likelihood” test).25 The “likelihood” test
compares two separate marks, and how consumers perceive them, to establish
either a common or contrasting overall impression.26 The “likelihood” test is
image has been updated seven times. Id. In each portrait she wears a red garment with a white
accent, but the style of her clothes, hair, and face have been updated to “reflect the changing faces
of American women.” Id.
18. Merch. & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 639 (3d Cir. 1992)
(“Once the requisite showing has been made, trademark protection is of infinite duration.”).
19. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th Cir.
1999).
20. Id.
21. See Mark & Jacoby, supra note 6, at 438 (quoting Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1048).
22. 37 C.F.R. § 2.72(a)(2) (2013). Making an amendment to a federally registered mark tends
to raise this issue. When amending a registered mark “the applicant may amend the description or
drawing of the mark only if: . . . (2) The proposed amendment does not materially alter the mark.
The Office will determine whether a proposed amendment materially alters a mark by comparing
the proposed amendment with the description or drawing of the mark filed with the original
application.” Id. But see One Indus., LLC v. Jim O’Neal Distrib., Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th
Cir. 2009) (holding that “tacking will be allowed only if the marks are virtually identical”).
23. Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(quoting Ilco Corp. v. Ideal Sec. Hardware Corp., 527 F.2d 1221, 1224 (C.C.P.A. 1976)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
24. See Louangel, Inc. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1809, 1812 (S.D. Tex.
2013).
25. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp. v. Freightliner Corp., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1116, 1119–20
(N.D. Ill. 1998) (deciding on whether tacking should be allowed where the new mark exists as
“AMERICAN LAFRANCE EAGLE” and the old mark as “AMERICAN LA FRANCE” with the
accompanying image of a bird).
26. Id.
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used when a court is “determining whether one mark infringes upon the rights
of the owner of a different mark,” whereas tacking is used when an owner is
attempting to continue the life of his own mark.27 Despite this difference, these
analyses both use consumer impression as a determining factor; therefore, the
rationalization for each is analogous.28 But as the “likelihood” test is widely and
fairly consistently used by the courts, tacking is not as common and lacks
standardized application.29
The courts have yet to develop a precise test to determine the particular
circumstances that permit continued trademark use.30 Courts use varying
devices to determine legal equivalency, and, given the lack of legal guidance,
courts disagree on the appropriate method that should be used to resolve the
issue.
This Comment addresses the difficulty in analyzing tacking as a matter of law
and illustrates that tacking should be determined as a question of fact. First, this
Comment discusses the legal differences between questions of law and questions
of fact. This Comment then examines tacking with regard to trademarks and the
analyses by courts that have determined the issue to be a question of law. Next,
this Comment compares the decisions by courts that determined tacking to be a
question of law with decisions by courts that have determined it to be one of
fact. This Comment then analogizes tacking to the “likelihood of confusion”
test. Further, this Comment examines the nature of trademarks and the complex
effect of market and personal aesthetic preferences on viewer impression.
Finally, this Comment finally concludes that measuring tacking by commercial
impression is inherently a factual issue, and, without a clear legal test for
continuous commercial impression, the analysis relies solely on a judge’s
individualized perception of a mark’s potential impressions.

27. See id. at 1120.
28. Id. at 1120–21. The court noted that “[t]he [likelihood] test is similar to the tacking
inquiry because both depend on many of the same factors, and in a more abstract sense, both involve
the degree of similarity between two marks.” Id. See also Louangel, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1812 (holding that “[t]he courts’ treatment of the tacking question is commensurate with their
treatment of the related issue of ‘likelihood of confusion’ in the trademark context”). Additionally,
these issues are so intertwined that in deciding many “likelihood of confusion” issues the question
of tacking arises to determine whether one party used the mark prior to the other party’s use of the
mark. Id.
29. See infra notes 98–113 and accompanying text.
30. See Mark & Jacoby, supra note 6, at 440 (noting that courts have a more difficult time
determining tacking issues because there is no elemental test similar to the “likelihood of
confusion” test).
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I. CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT AS TO WHETHER TACKING SHOULD BE TREATED AS A
QUESTION OF LAW OR A QUESTION OF FACT
A. Distinguishing Questions of Law and Fact: Treatment Within the
Courtroom and Upon Appeal
Deciding whether an issue requires a legal or factual determination is
complicated without knowing how each of these categories is defined.31 The
Supreme Court has stated, “we [do not] yet know of any other rule or principle
that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion.”32
Usually, these determinations are made based on the roles within the courtroom.
Whether something is considered a question of law or a question of fact is
often determined by which member of the judicial process is best suited to make
a determination on the specific issue.33 The determination may be ascertained
by differentiating the purposes of the judge and jury.34 Typically, in a jury trial,
the jury makes findings of fact and the judge decides issues of law.35
Accordingly, in a jury trial, the judge formulates the applicability of the legal
standard, while the jury, as the fact finder, “ascertain[s] what happened in a
specific case.”36 Regarding the court’s findings, the factual findings and legal
determinations must be made separately and distinctly.37 There is, however, an
exception to this distinction at the trial level.
Before a trademark dispute even reaches appeal, most courts agree that
“summary judgment is appropriate if the court is satisfied that the products or
marks are so dissimilar that no question of fact is presented.”38 Whether a factual

31. Julia Reytblat, Is Originality in Copyright Law a “Question of Law” or a “Question of
Fact?”: The Fact Solution, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 181, 195 (1999).
32. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982).
33. See Reytblat, supra note 31, at 195 n.104. Reytblat quotes the Supreme Court’s
discussion of matters of law and fact and how they should be decided within the courtroom, stating,
“as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than
another to decide the issue in question.” Id. (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
34. See Richard A. Machonkin, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. and Hilton Davis
Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.: The Federal Circuit Gets Its Laws and Its Facts Straight,
9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 181, 181 (1996).
35. Machonkin, supra note 34, at 183 (discussing the analytical distinction between questions
of law and questions of fact).
36. Id.
37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also dictate that,
“[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge
the witnesses’ credibility.” FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
38. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 746 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1984)
(finding that as a matter of law “Donkey Kong” and “King Kong” were not confusingly similar
after reviewing surveys, which offered no real proof that there was an issue of confusion). Further,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
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question even exists is also open for interpretation, as exemplified by cases
where the evidence showed that different commercial impressions were ignored
by the court when it granted summary judgment.39 The distinction between fact
and law is further complicated based on where the issue falls within the judicial
process.
At the appellate level, issues are treated differently depending on whether an
issue is a factual or legal matter.40 Issues of fact will not be overturned on review
unless they are clearly erroneous41 because the trier of fact, whether the judge or
jury, has been specifically designated to make factual findings.42 Conversely,
where there are issues of law “[o]n de novo review, an appellate court disregards
the trial court’s findings and makes independent conclusions as if it is itself the
trial court.”43 Some courts have decided that these issues cannot easily be
separated at either the trial or appellate level and instead apply a hybridized
treatment of fact and law.
Some issues are considered mixed questions of fact and law and require the
court to carefully balance facts with legal standards.44 For example, in a multifactor test, the court settles all evidence relating to the factors as a question of
fact, but the weight and ultimate conclusion of the sum of those factors is a
question of law.45 There is not a clear method to determine how the mixedquestion analytical framework should be applied.46 Therefore, courts often
judgment as a matter of law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or
denying the motion.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
39. See, e.g., Louangel, Inc. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1809, 1815 (S.D.
Tex. 2013) (finding that expert testimony cannot necessarily show how consumers may respond to
particular changes in trademarks design).
40. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969)
(asserting that appellate courts must remember that their role is not to review factual findings de
novo).
41. See Machonkin, supra note 34, at 181.
42. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 856 (1982).
43. See Reytblat, supra note 31, at 197 n.113. Historically, questions of law on appeal are to
be treated completely separate from issues of fact. As an early Supreme Court case held with regard
to legal review:
[I]t has been established by repeated decisions that each question so certified must be a
distinct point or proposition of law, clearly stated, so that it can be definitely answered,
without regard to other issues of law or of fact in the case. The points certified must be
questions of law only, and not questions of fact, or of mixed law and fact—“not such as
involve or imply conclusions or judgment by the court upon the weight or effect of
testimony or facts adduced in the cause.”
Jewell v. Knight, 123 U.S. 426, 432 (1887) (quoting Dennistoun v. Stewart, 59 U.S. 565, 568
(1856)).
44. See Machonkin, supra note 34, at 183–84 (noting mixed questions of law and fact often
have no mechanical test to assist the court with resolving the issue).
45. Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 624 (6th Cir. 1998)
(identifying the “likelihood of confusion” test as a mixed question).
46. See Machonkin, supra note 34, at 183–84 (noting that the Supreme Court has not ruled
on mixed questions).
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apply the framework inconsistently.47 Courts using this method will look at
whether a jury or judge is in the best position to decide the issue.48
Mixed questions of law and fact are present not only in application, but also
in the standard of review for these issues,49 and courts often disagree about how
that standard should apply.50 Some courts review the entire issue de novo,51
while some apply the clearly erroneous standard,52 but, most commonly, courts
will employ the clearly erroneous standard to those issues that were considered
factual issues and de novo review to the legal issues.53
B. Tacking: Furthering a Trademark Owner’s Protection of His Mark
Tacking connects a newer mark that is currently in use to a former version of
the mark, but only if the two marks are legal equivalents.54 Two marks may
“differ[] slightly in their literal meaning or grammatical presentation, [but]
nevertheless possess the same connotation in context.”55 Trademarks used over
extended periods of time, or even those used for relatively short periods but
during shifts in market trends, may qualify for continued protection under the
tacking concept.56 Tacking owners receive “the same rights in the new mark as
[they] ha[d] in the old.”57 Therefore, tacking deters appropriation by
competitors.58

47. See id. (discussing the implications of the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance on the issue
of mixed questions of law and fact).
48. See id. at 184. There are several policy factors to consider when determining which party
is in the best position to assess either a factual or legal issue, such as, “judicial administration; the
expertise of the actors; whether the decision will be dominated by fact-finding or rule-making; the
type of evidence to be considered; the need for uniformity; and whether appellate review would
produce useful precedent.” Id. at 184–85 (footnotes omitted).
49. 2A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER’S EDITION § 3:824 (2003).
50. Id. (explaining that appellate courts do not agree as to how mixed questions of law and
fact should be handled upon review).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. De novo review is defined as “[a]n appeal in which the appellate court uses the trial
court’s record but reviews the evidence and law without deference to the trial court’s rulings.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 112 (9th ed. 2009).
54. See Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(stating that tacking may be permitted when two slightly different marks retain the same
“connotation in context”).
55. Id.; see also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 17:26, at 17–63 (“A mark can be modified
or changed without abandonment or loss of priority if done in such a way that the continuing
common element of the mark retains its impact and symbolizes a continuing commercial
impression.”).
56. See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th Cir.
1999) (discussing the legal implications altering trademarks and tacking).
57. Id.
58. Id. The court asserted that “[w]ithout tacking, a trademark owner’s priority in his mark
would be reduced each time he made the slightest alteration to the mark.” Id.
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Any alteration to the older mark may not be exceedingly drastic, because
tacking is not permitted if the older mark is materially altered.59 Material
alteration is determined by legal equivalency, or more accurately, whether the
marks create the “same continuing commercial impression.”60 Consequently,
the relationship between the two marks must be:
[T]he legal equivalent of the mark in question or indistinguishable
therefrom, and the consumer should consider both as the same mark.
However, for the purposes of “tacking,” even if the two marks are
confusingly similar, they still may not be legal equivalents. Instead,
the marks must create “the same, continuing commercial impression,”
and the later mark should not materially differ from or alter the
character of the mark attempted to be “tacked.”61
Use of the term “legal” in the phrase “legal equivalents” does not mean that
the mark may not be measured by a question of fact, rather each mark must make
a similar commercial impression on the viewer.62 Courts that have applied
tacking as a question of fact consider commercial impression as primarily
measured by the consumer.63 The impression on the consumer is measured by
both the visual presentation of the mark and the mark’s aural appearance, such
as how the viewer pronounces a word within the mark.64 Because trademarks
identify the source of products or services, tacking is generally allowed if “the
new mark serves the same identificatory function as the old mark,”65 and if the
meaning conveyed or “mental reaction it evokes” is the same as the old mark.66

59. 37 C.F.R. § 2.72(a)(2) (2013). Often times tacking is allowed where there are “[m]inor
differences between marks, such as an inconsequential modification or modernization . . . because
a consumer would consider the marks the same.” Specht v. Google Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d 570, 583
(N.D. Ill. 2010).
60. Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 623 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Van Dyne-Crotty, 926 F.2d at 1159) (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, there is one federal court that disagrees with using the phrase “legal
equivalency” in considering tacking. In Navistar, the court held that legal equivalency was to be
used in infringement cases and not for tacking. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp. v. Freightliner Corp.,
49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1116, 1120 (N.D. Ill. 1998). The court stated that the standard for tacking
is the commercial impression test, but to refer to this as a legal equivalency analysis was inaccurate.
Id. The court believed legal equivalency to was “an entirely different doctrine which holds that
rights in a picture mark encompass rights in a word if the picture evokes the mental impression of
the word.” Id.
61. Van Dyne-Crotty, 926 F.2d at 1159 (emphasis added) (quoting Ilco Corp. v. Ideal Sec.
Hardware Corp., 527 F.2d 1221, 1224 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Data Concepts, 150 F.3d at 623; see also Louangel, Inc. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 106
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1809, 1813 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (determining that while the marks sound the same,
the visual appearance of the two marks were substantially different).
65. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th Cir.
1999).
66. Mark & Jacoby, supra note 6, at 434.
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A consumer reaction test lends itself to being a fact-based inquiry, and many
courts appropriately determine tacking cases as an issue of fact.
C. Measuring Tacking as a Question of Law
A slim majority of federal circuits that addressed tacking disputes held that
tacking should be settled as a question of law.67 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit treated tacking as a question of law, basing its analysis
primarily on its own interpretation of the mark rather than the consumer’s
interpretation.68 In Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., the Federal
Circuit affirmed the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board (TTAB) decision based purely on its visual inspection of the
marks without regard to consumer impression.69 The Federal Circuit refused to
allow an owner to tack “a mark with a narrow commercial impression onto one
with a broader commercial impression.”70 The Federal Circuit justified its
finding by looking to the TTAB’s decision and inferring that the TTAB’s finding
implied that the two marks created different commercial impressions.71
However, the majority conceded that the only measurement that the TTAB used
was its own impression of how a purchaser would perceive the mark.72 Allowing
a non-legal standard to determine the tacking issue, rather than relying on
evidence that illustrated consumer perception, established precedent that could
lead to inconsistent outcomes.73

67. See, e.g., Van Dyne–Crotty, 926 F.2d at 1159–60 (affirming the TTAB’s determination
that the marks “CLOTHES THAT WORK” and “CLOTHES THAT WORK. FOR THE WORK
YOU DO” are not legal equivalents as a matter of law); Data Concepts, 150 F.3d at 623 (deciding
on whether “DCI.com” could be tacked on to the earlier use of “DCI”); Louangel, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1811 (discussing whether the newer mark with “a minimalist or more abstract . . . outline
of a cow’s head with horizontal horns, and with ‘LongHorn’ as one word over ‘steakhouse’ in a
sleeker font” could be tacked onto the older mark with “chunky font and . . . a babyfaced cartoon
cow’s head with vertical horns”).
68. Van Dyne–Crotty, 926 F.2d at 1160.
69. Id. at 1159–60.
70. Id. at 1160.
71. See id. (explaining that “the [TTAB’s] conclusion necessarily implies a foundational
finding that the two marks create differing commercial impressions in the minds of consumers, a
finding that has not been proven clearly erroneous”).
72. Id. at 1159. The court stated, “[i]t does not appear that the [TTAB] entertained any other
evidence concerning the legal equivalence of these two marks except for the visual or aural
appearance of the marks themselves.” Id. The concurring judge disagreed with the finding by the
majority and believed that ordinary consumers could find the two marks created the same
commercial impression. Id. at 1160–61 (Newman, J., concurring). Judge Newman concurred
because the facts did not support finding otherwise. Id.
73. See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 346–47 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that
within the “likelihood of confusion” test the circuits often switch tests and have no consistent
method of deciding these cases). Inconsistent decisions create the risk of undermining trust within
the judicial system, and “without sufficient grounds for trust in the system, there is a greater risk of
injustice for weaker parties with legitimate cases who will not pursue their rights (and in the long
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The Federal Circuit clarified its holding in In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating
Corp.74 The court explained that for tacking, “[n]o evidence need be entertained
other than the visual or aural appearance of the marks themselves.”75
Additionally, courts may analogize the marks to marks that were analyzed in a
different case.76 Courts are often less likely to permit tacking when two marks
share a higher degree of similarity than marks in other cases.77
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit shares the Federal Circuit’s
approach in determining tacking as a question of law.78 In Data Concepts, Inc.
v. Digital Consulting, Inc., the Sixth Circuit adopted the Federal Circuit’s
approach by stating that legal equivalency is determined by how the mark looks
and sounds, and the court provided no other criteria for either denying or
allowing tacking.79 The court began its analysis by remarking that the marks
were not visually similar.80 The court cited to other decisions, but it did not
discuss the commercial impression with regard to the average consumer.81
Instead, the Sixth Circuit conducted a piecemeal comparison of the marks to
show that they were not similar and did not create a “continuous commercial
impression.”82

run the body of the law as a whole will suffer).” Sarah M. R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Justice,
59 ALA. L. REV. 1, 12 (2007).
74. 240 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (deciding whether the previously registered marks,
“(212)-M-A-T-T-R-E-S” and “1-800-MATTRES, AND LEAVE OFF THE LAST S THAT’S THE
S FOR SAVINGS,” were the legal equivalents of “1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S”).
75. Id.
76. Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 624 (6th Cir. 1998). The
Data Concepts court cited two other instances where the marks were similar but held not to be legal
equivalents. The first example being “CLOTHES THAT WORK” and “CLOTHES THAT WORK
FOR THE WORK YOU DO.” Id. (citing Van Dyne–Crotty, 926 F.2d at 1160). The other example
given was a comparison of “Pro-Kut” and “Pro-Cuts.” Id. (citing Pro–Cuts v. Schilz–Price Enters.,
Inc., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1224, 1227 (T.T.A.B. 1993)). The court justified its decision on “DCI”
and “DCI.com” based not on outside impressions, but by comparing those marks to the marks in
other cases. Data Concepts, 150 F.3d at 624.
77. See supra note 76.
78. Data Concepts, 150 F.3d at 623.
79. Id. (quoting Van Dyne–Crotty, 926 F.2d at 1159); see also Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v.
W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 1999) (determining the marks could not be
tacked because no showing was made that demonstrated that consumers viewed the two marks as
identical). Before the Ninth Circuit moved to viewing tacking as a question of fact, the Brookfield
court made a visual inspection of the marks “The Movie Buff’s Movie Store” and “moviebuff.com”
and decided that because “the latter contains three fewer words, drops the possessive, omits a space,
and adds ‘.com’ to the end,” they did not create a continuous commercial impression. Id. However,
the court noted that their decision was partially based on the fact that one party failed to show that
customers viewed the two marks as the same. Id.
80. Data Concepts, 150 F.3d at 624.
81. See id. (citing several illustrative cases).
82. Id. at 623–24.
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D. Measuring Tacking as a Question of Fact
Judges who have ruled that tacking should be a question of law rely primarily
on their own personal impression of the mark, but judges who believe tacking
should be a question of fact rely on extrajudicial methods. The U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, which views tacking as a question of
fact, noted “[a] party . . . should submit evidence of consumer perceptions
regarding the commercial impression of the marks sought to be tacked.”83
Additionally, the court stated, “court[s] should not merely speculate on how
consumers would perceive the marks.”84
Some jurisdictions have used the “likelihood of confusion” test, which is an
analogous test, to determine whether tacking is a factual or legal issue.85 The
Ninth Circuit determined that tacking was a question of fact because it held the
similar “likelihood” test to be one of fact as well.86 In Quiksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta
Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that because
reasonable minds may differ regarding commercial impression, questions raised
by these issues must be settled as a matter of fact.87 The court relied on the Ninth
Circuit’s earlier decision, that “likelihood of confusion” in trademarks should be
measured as a question of fact, when it determined the proper test for tacking.88
The Quiksilver court found the testimony of the Senior Vice President of
Marketing, the original clothing designer, and the Chief Executive Officer
sufficient to illustrate that a reasonable jury could have decided that the marks
did not present the same continuing commercial impression.89 The court used
this evidence to find that the lower court’s decision to allow tacking was clearly
erroneous.90
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also adopted the view that
determining whether a mark was substantially similar to another is a “threshold
question,” which was typically a factual issue.91 In Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp.
83. Louangel, Inc. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1809, 1812 (S.D. Tex. 2013)
(holding that tacking should be a question of fact, despite believing that a court should not merely
speculate on consumer perception).
84. Id.
85. See supra note 28 (discussing how the “likelihood of confusion” test and the tacking
inquiry are similar).
86. Quiksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749, 759 (9th Cir. 2006).
87. Id. at 758–60 (deciding whether the mark “ROXY” could be tacked onto the older mark
of “QUICKSILVER ROXY” when the evidence is not conclusive).
88. Id. at 759.
89. Id. at 759–60. Testimony showed that at the time the brand was launched there was a
concern that no one would know what “ROXY” stood for. Id. at 759. The company combined the
two names so that people would recognize the “ROXY” brand as being affiliated with Quiksilver,
which might affect how consumers would react to the mark. Id. at 759–60.
90. Id. at 760.
91. Exxon Corp. v. Exxene Corp., 696 F.2d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding that the
difference in aural and visual impression is one of fact for the jury to decide, such as comparing the
impression between “Exxon” and “Exxene”).
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v. Freightliner Corp., the court moved from considering tacking as a question of
law to one of fact.92 This transition was prompted by the Seventh Circuit’s
determination that “likelihood of confusion” was a question of fact.93 The court,
in Navistar, adopted this analysis, but noted that the Seventh Circuit did not have
a test for analyzing tacking.94 Ultimately, the court looked to the “likelihood”
test and held that the commercial impression was best determined by capturing
marketplace reactions rather than the court’s own visual inspection.95
E. Comparing the Tacking Analysis to the “Likelihood of Confusion” Test
The “likelihood of confusion” test is a direct result of the Lanham Act.96
Courts use the test to “determin[e] whether one mark infringes upon the rights
of the owner of a different mark.”97 Because trademarks exist to signify the
source of a certain product or service, consumer confusion about what a mark
signifies is a key determination to establish whether there is infringement.98
Courts regularly use the “likelihood” test to decide whether tacking issues
should be determined as a question of law or as a question of fact.99 Both tests
have similar elements and measure the mark’s degree of similarity.100
Additionally, the tests seek to determine the degree of commercial confusion

92. 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1116, 1120–21 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1121.
95. Id. (agreeing with the plaintiff that “mere visual and aural comparison of two marks is an
insufficient basis for a party seeking to tack”).
96. J. Steven Gardner, Trademark Infringement, Likelihood of Confusion, and Trademark
Parody: Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 716 (1993).
The Lanham Act was passed to protect trademarks. Id. The relevant portion of the Lanham Act is:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services . . . uses in commerce
any word, term, name, symbol . . . which [] is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to . . . his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
97. Navistar, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
98. Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002). There are three
types of confusion that might materialize when viewing a mark: “(1) general-knowledge confusion,
(2) sensory-perception confusion, and (3) subliminal confusion.” SCHMITT & SIMONSON, supra
note 8, at 218–19. General-knowledge confusion is essentially whether the viewer believed the
companies to be associated. Id. at 219. Sensory-perception confusion is mistaking a brand to be
another based on the relatedness in design. Id. Subliminal confusion is not as direct, but refers to
“the likelihood that consumers will be attracted to defendant’s product on the strength of the
goodwill and positive image established by [the] plaintiff[‘s product].” Id. at 228.
99. Navistar, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121 (agreeing with plaintiff’s argument “that because
the Seventh Circuit treats the likelihood of confusion inquiry as a matter of fact, tacking should
also be treated as a matter of fact”).
100. Id. (stating that “[i]t is undeniable that tacking and likelihood of confusion are similar
inquiries, and we see no principled reason why tacking should be considered a matter of law when
confusion is not”).
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and whether the two marks evoke similar reactions from the viewer.101 The
“likelihood” test directly compares the marks, but the comparison is just one
factor.102 Despite the presence of multiple factors, courts strongly consider the
impact the mark makes within the commercial market.103
Although similar, the tests for “likelihood of confusion” and for determining
commercial impression contain different standards. Tacking requires a higher
standard than the “likelihood” test.104 The “likelihood” test contains a variety of
factors that are used by the court to determine whether confusion exists.105
Unlike the “likelihood” test, the tacking analysis is “a more difficult [task]
because no comparable multi-factor test has been developed.”106 Additionally,
whereas the “likelihood” test measures confusion, confusion cannot be equated
with legal equivalency.107
The “likelihood” test consists of many different factors.108 Some elements
courts consider, but are not limited to, are the following:
(1) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the relatedness of the goods
or services; (3) the similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual
confusion; (5) the marketing channels used; (6) the likely degree of
purchaser care; (7) the defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and
(8) the likelihood of the expansion of the product lines.109

101. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. “Just Did It” Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1993)
(determining that customer confusion is pivotal to the court’s analysis); Mushroom Makers, Inc. v.
R. G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that the determinative question is
whether “ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled”); Spice Islands, Inc. v. Frank Tea
& Spice Co., 505 F.2d 1293, 1296 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (holding that confusion should be measured by
“prospective purchasers”).
102. James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274–75 (7th Cir. 1976)
(stating that a visual comparison is only part of the “likelihood” test and the mark’s effect within
the marketplace is equally important).
103. Id.
104. See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th Cir.
1999) (referring to the tacking standard as “exceedingly strict”); see also Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v.
Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the marks may be so similar
that it is confusing, yet the marks do not meet the tacking requirements).
105. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
106. See Mark & Jacoby, supra note 6, at 440. See also Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp. v.
Freightliner Corp., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1116, 1121 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (noting that there has been
no test set forth to determine tacking issues in the Seventh Circuit).
107. See Van Dyne-Crotty, 926 F.2d at 1159 (“[F]or the purposes of ‘tacking,’ even if the two
marks are confusingly similar, they still may not be legal equivalents.”).
108. Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 624 (6th Cir. 1998).
109. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642, 648
(6th Cir. 1982)).
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These factors serve as a guide rather than a required checklist.110 Additionally,
courts may consider these factors, but are not required to weigh the factors that
do not aid their analysis.111
The “likelihood” test is not aimed at ascertaining what the court thinks about
the marks, but rather how consumers within the market construe the mark.112
The critical viewpoint is that of the “ordinary purchaser,” a category that consists
of “both discriminating and casual, relatively unknowledgeable buyers.”113
Courts that decide “likelihood” questions consistently look to the marketplace
to resolve disputes.114
Courts routinely rely on surveys to establish whether confusion exists within
the market.115 Surveys are helpful because “actual confusion is persuasive proof
110. Homeowners Grp., Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, 931 F.2d 1100, 1107 (6th Cir. 1991).
For the purpose of analogizing the “likelihood” test to tacking, the essential factors are similarity
and actual confusion. Similarity refers to how closely the marks look and sound, and actual
confusion refers to support and evidence that the public is confused by the marks. See AMF Inc.
v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 351 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that “[s]imilarity of the marks is
tested on three levels: sight, sound, and meaning”); see also Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp.,
305 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Evidence of actual confusion ‘constitutes persuasive proof that
future confusion is likely.’” (quoting Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1265
(9th Cir. 2001))).
111. Homeowners Grp., 931 F.2d at 1107 (recognizing that all the factors may not be
applicable in all cases). How these factors are applied varies from Circuit to Circuit:
While some circuits list at least ten factors, other circuits only articulate six or seven.
While all circuits consider the strength of the plaintiff’s mark, the similarity of the two
marks, and the defendant’s intent, only six circuits consider the similarity of sales
facilities and only ten circuits consider the sophistication of the consumer in determining
the likelihood of confusion.
See Bird & Steckel, supra note 7, at 1022 (footnotes omitted).
112. Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri-Kine Camera Co., 451 F.2d 1190, 1195 (2d Cir. 1971)
(applying the test to camera purchasers).
113. Id.
114. See AMF Inc., 599 F.2d at 351 (holding that similarity of the marks should be measured
by how they are construed within the marketplace, and considering how the mark looks, how it
sounds, and what meaning it creates in the viewer). Surveys are an accurate method of determining
widespread consumer impression and are widely accepted by the court. See, e.g., Thane Int’l, 305
F.3d at 902–03 (making reference to a survey of 300 respondents); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad.
Companies, Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 246 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that the court used survey evidence as
part of its “likelihood” analysis); and James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266,
279 (7th Cir. 1976) (using survey results as part of the court’s analysis).
115. See cases cited supra note 114. There are four main survey methods for determining
“likelihood of confusion.” John P. Liefeld, How Surveys Overestimate the Likelihood of Consumer
Confusion, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 939, 940 (2003). The first is “Top of Mind, in which respondents
are shown the junior product and asked, ‘What is the first thing that comes to your mind when
looking at this __________.’ If respondents do not mention the name of a company, they are asked
directly which company comes to mind.” Id. Another method is “Company Identification-Forced
Choice” where the survey taker is asked directly who they think makes the brand. Id. The next
method is called “Company Identification” where products are shown together and the survey taker
is asked whether they believe the products are made by different companies. Id. The last method
is called “Simulated Choice” which measures a consumer’s purchase decision as if they were
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of the likelihood of confusion, [with which] a reasonable jury could conclude
that a likelihood of confusion exists.”116 Testimony of individuals confused by
two marks may not be enough to prove confusion under the test.117 Surveys,
however, capture an overall snapshot of consumer reaction.118 There is no
minimum percentage from the survey results required to show that confusion
exists; rather, the standard is whether the number of participants reported as
confused “create[s] a reasonably disputed factual issue.”119 Relevant factors
used to determine the weight of confusion, other than the number of confused
viewers, may include the types of people surveyed and the degree of
confusion.120
F. “Likelihood of Confusion” Measured as a Matter of Law, Fact, or a Mixed
Question of Both
Courts have ruled on “likelihood of confusion” matters as a question of law,
fact, or a mixed question of both.121 The traditional view has been that the
“likelihood” test is a factual question, but some circuits have moved away from
this view and started to incorporate an issue of law into part of the analysis.122

purchasing in real life and then has the survey taker explain why they chose one product over
another. Id.
116. Thane Int’l, Inc., 305 F.3d at 903 (holding that a survey where a quarter of people
surveyed showed confusion was enough for a jury to conclude that likelihood of confusion exists
between exercise machine marks “Trek” and “OrbiTrek”).
117. Id. at 902.
118. See id. (stating that “[i]f enough people have been actually confused, then a likelihood
that people are confused is established”). The downside to requiring or giving substantial weight
to surveys is the cost of conducting a survey. Larry C. Jones, Developing and Using Survey
Evidence in Trademark Litigation, 19 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 471, 474 (1989). Performing a proper
survey can be expensive, as “[t]he direct cost of a survey often runs in the tens of thousands of
dollars. In addition, there are indirect costs such as the increased attorney’s fees incurred in
assisting in the preparation of the survey and in presenting and deposing survey experts.” Id.
119. See Warner Bros., 720 F.2d at 246 (noting that in every survey there will be some
participants confused between marks and stating that the existence of some confusion does not
necessarily prove a likelihood of confusion); see also James Burrough, 540 F.2d at 279 (holding
that a survey of fifteen percent of the “restaurant-going public” might be confused by the marks
and that this is enough to show that confusion might exist).
120. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Disc. Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1167 (11th Cir. 1982)
(explaining that in determining the weight to give confusion, “[p]erhaps as important as . . . the
number of instances of confusion are the kinds of persons confused and degree of confusion. Shortlived confusion or confusion of individuals casually acquainted with a business is worthy of little
weight, while confusion of actual customers of a business is worthy of substantial weight”). When
considering whether to use surveys, it is important to note that in “likelihood of confusion” cases
the burden of proving confusion lies with the plaintiff. See Jones, supra note 118, at 474.
121. Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 624 (6th Cir. 1998); Brett
Thomas Reynolds, Appellate Review of Lanham Act Violations: Is Likelihood of Confusion A
Question of Law or Fact?, 38 SW. L.J. 743, 746–47 (1984).
122. Reynolds, supra note 121, at 746–47.

2014]

Judicial Speculation on Consumer Impression

1037

A number of circuits continue to treat “likelihood of confusion” as a factual
issue.123 The Seventh Circuit has consistently held that the “likelihood” issue is
entirely a factual question, because without labeling it an issue of fact the court
would have opened the door to appellate court review of decisions de novo rather
than the clearly erroneous standard.124 If the issue is a question of law, the
outcome at the appellate level may depend on what the judge personally believes
is similar, without any consideration of the “likelihood” factors.125
Courts that viewed “likelihood of confusion” as an issue of fact emphasized
the importance of the relationship between the mark and the consumer.126 The
courts asserted that the best place to look for likelihood of confusion was within
the marketplace and not in the “vacuum” of the courtroom.127 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was particularly at odds with the notion that this
issue could be a matter of law, noting:
The fact that the litigating trademarks appear side by side in the
judicial solemnity of the courtroom is by itself enough of a
falsification of actual market conditions to defy realistic appraisal.
Judges, therefore, must attempt to pierce this patently unreal situation
and refer to the operative facts behind the scene.128
Each Circuit that treated tacking as a factual issue or a mixed issue reasoned that
consumer reaction was the proper source to determine confusion.129
The majority of the remaining circuits consider this issue to be a mixed
question of law and fact.130 There is a clear line within these courts that separate
123. See, e.g., Nat’l Bus. Forms & Printing, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 671 F.3d 526, 532 (5th
Cir. 2012) (holding that confusion was a question of fact only reviewed for clear error); Peoples
Fed. Sav. Bank v. People’s United Bank, 672 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that determining
the type of term being used and whether a secondary meaning exists was a question of fact and
describing this as a high standard); Bd. Of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Phx. Int’l Software,
Inc., 653 F.3d 448, 452, 477 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that an issue of fact existed, regarding the
likelihood of confusion, and the jury was in the best position to decide); Heartsprings, Inc. v.
Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 553 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding the rule of viewing confusion
issues as questions of fact); SquirtCo. v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980)
(acknowledging that as a question of fact the court must uphold the lower court’s ruling unless
clearly erroneous).
124. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1425, 1428–31 (7th Cir. 1985)
(recognizing that the appellate court should not attempt to determine factual issues, because the
trial court is in the best position to assess the factual issues).
125. Id. at 1429.
126. Id.
127. Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev. Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1981).
128. Id. (quoting 3 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 82.2 (3d ed. 1969)).
129. See Homeowners Grp., Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1107 (6th
Cir. 1991) (“The ultimate question remains whether relevant consumers are likely to believe that
the products or services offered by the parties are affiliated in some way.”).
130. See, e.g., Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 775 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that the issue
is a question of fact, but the weight of the likelihood factors can be considered a question of law);
Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 390 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that while
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what is considered a question of fact and what is considered a question of law.
The courts weigh the “likelihood” factors as a question of fact and the weight
given to each factor is considered a question of law.131 The “likelihood” test
elements are “foundational factors [which] are factual and subject to a clearly
erroneous standard of review, while the weighing of these findings on the
ultimate issue of the likelihood of confusion is a question of law.”132
The mixed method is consistent with the fluid balance between law and
fact.133 Because “courts retain an important authority to monitor the outer limits
of substantial similarity within which a jury is permitted to make the factual
determination,” they also have the ability to weigh the legal importance of those
determinations.134
II. THE LACK OF A CLEAR TEST FOR TACKING ENCOURAGES GAP-FILLING AND
CREATES INCONSISTENT HOLDINGS
A. Visual and Aural Impressions are Unique to Each Viewer
Interpretation of images and sounds is unique to each consumer.135 An
observer’s reaction varies depending on age, location, personal preference, and
other factors.136 There is an entire discipline devoted to the study of how images
and marks create meaning and “how they connect with the network of meanings
present in a culture.”137 Consumers form impressions from branding aesthetics
based on “primary elements, styles, and themes,” which may evoke varying
conscious or subconscious reactions.138
the lower court’s determination should be reviewed if clearly erroneous, balancing the likelihood
factors can be measured as a question of law and reviewed de novo); A & H Sportswear, Inc. v.
Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 197, 201–02 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that the confusion
aspect was a matter of fact, but the standard applied to that confusion was a matter of law, therefore
it was a mixed question); Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419, 422 (6th Cir. 1999)
(stating that the appellate court will accept the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous
and review de novo the factors as applied to determine a likelihood of confusion).
131. Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 1983).
132. Id.
133. Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 246 (2d Cir. 1983).
134. Id.
135. See Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996) (discussing the complex
interaction between persons and images).
136. See DANESI, supra note 10, at 21.
137. Id. at 2. Semiotics is the study of how individuals react to different visual cues. Id. The
term originates from the Greek word, “semeion,” meaning mark or sign. Id. at 17. It was originally
used to refer to symptoms in medical science, in that the word referred to an indication of an
underlying, more complex state. Id.
138. See SCHMITT & SIMONSON, supra note 8, at 168. The complex emotional reactions that
occur when presented with visual stimuli is rooted in the development of “aesthetics.” Id. at 3. The
word itself comes from the Greek word “aisthetikos” and was interpreted by a German philosopher,
Alexander Baumgarter, who claimed that aesthetics was “a science of sensuous knowledge in
contrast with logic, whose goal is truth.” Id. at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Subtle changes from one mark to another may create significant discrepancies
in perceived commercial impressions depending on the individual. An
individual’s reaction to a mark compared to another’s reaction may depend on
that individual’s experience with that particular visual design,139 color,140 the
context of an element within the mark,141 sound,142 or how that individual fills
in missing information.143 A more accurate picture of overall commercial
impression can be achieved by looking to the marketplace for these reactions.144
Trademarks tend to be simplistic as to allow immediate identification by the
consumer of the source of products or services. A complex design may not
accomplish the same result. However, it is important not to assume that
seemingly simplistic marks create only one commercial impression in every
viewer. Trademarks are designed and intended to trigger widespread and
immediate recognition, but every consumer will react in a slightly different
way.145 While the feelings and impressions of the viewer may not be as complex
and diverse as they would be if the consumer was observing a Cézanne, Hopper,
or other artistic masterpiece, individual impressions still vary, and courts have
139. See CROZIER, supra note 9, at 67 (stating that familiarity with a design correlates to
preference for that design); Elisa Steenberg, Visual Aesthetic Experience, 41 J. AESTHETIC EDUC.
89, 92 (2007) (explaining aesthetic association may create a cognitive stimulation of either pleasure
or displeasure).
140. See CROZIER, supra note 9, at 144 (noting color related stimuli has been researched
extensively). The regular person can distinguish 10,000 hues, and perception to color depends on
the individual’s sensitivity to light. Id. See also Steenberg, supra note 139, at 89 (offering that an
individual’s reaction to a particular color or set of colors may be connected to the same neurological
process as emotions).
141. See DANESI, supra note 10, at 68–70 (noting that different symbols can take on a variety
of meanings). For example, the letter “X” has different meanings in the context of branding, such
as “[1] [t]he signature of any illiterate person . . . [2] [c]ancellation [3] [t]he unknown [4] [a]
location on a map . . . [5] [a] motion picture rating . . . [or] [6] [t]he symbol for a kiss.” Id. at 69–
70.
142. See SCHMITT & SIMONSON, supra note 8, at 85 (analogizing auditory stimuli to visual
stimuli).
143. See SCHMITT, supra note 8, at 170. Marketing analysts look at these factors in order to
create positive reactions in large portions of the purchasing public. See DANESI, supra note 10, at
16–17. To do so these images are understood to be interpreted on its face as well as the meaning it
carries. Id. at 20. Branding experts will attempt to market from both of these levels, which have
been termed the “signifier”—for the physical aspects of the mark, and the “signified”—the
“meaning captured by the sign.” Id. at 17. Establishing a deeper connection between the consumer
and the mark may bring marketers closer to establishing brand loyalty. See SCHMITT & SIMONSON,
supra note 8, at 185–86.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 165–66, 168. Given the minimal nature of most marks, customers will make
connections and interpret the mark based on their own personal history, knowledge, and practical
inferences. Id. at 170. Because each viewer has different experiences in these areas, there is no
guarantee that each conclusion a viewer draws about a mark will be identical to another person’s
conclusion. Id. For example, “[s]ometimes identity elements are literally misperceived by
customers. . . . Mazda’s original logo was a stylized representation of the letter ‘m,’ but it was
perceived by most consumers outside Japans as an ‘l.’” Id. at 98.
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not adequately created a standardized legal interpretation to deal with this
reality.
Individual purchasers have varied reactions to different images, and
measuring consumer impression without a clear legal standard increases the
likelihood of inconsistencies within the judicial system. As a Chief Marketing
and Creative Strategist for a corporate branding company stated: “We are
bombarded with so much branding today that our minds have been trained to
receive a lot of messages.”146 Consumer reaction to brands is complex and
something that marketing companies spend significant research and resources
deciphering.147 A broad survey indicated “that there are considerable varieties
in individuals’ inclinations for visual aesthetic experiences. . . . This inclination
may possibly be claimed to be due to an innate disposition for holding visual
aesthetic attitudes . . . . it is undoubtedly also due to certain social
circumstances.”148 Because of this complexity and variation, courts are not
suited to determine commercial impression without evidence to guide them.
B. Judges Are in a Poor Position to Decide Commercial Reaction
Allowing individual judges to determine tacking cases without a clear legal
standard increases the risk of inconsistent outcomes. Judges cannot divorce
themselves entirely from their decisions, but they are expected to base their
holdings on established legal standards.149 Without a clear standard for a tacking
analysis, “subjective likes and dislikes, predilections and prejudices, instincts
emotions, and habits” become the rule.150 Additionally, consistency creates a
system that mark owners can depend on for guidance when changing their

146. W.D. Murray, Nike’s Swoosh Adjustment 9-18-98, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 19, 1998, 8:43
PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nikes-swoosh-adjustment-9-18-98.
147. See SCHMITT & SIMONSON, supra note 8, at 194–95. Design firms focused on creating
brand identities often do not have the resources to perform their own research on customer reaction
to their designs. These firms often hire specialized research companies who focus solely on
performing design reaction surveys. Id. at 195.
148. Steenberg, supra note 139, at 90.
149. See Cravens, supra note 73, at 4–5. Cravens points out that it is not possible for anyone
to make a decision solely based on the law as our statutes and rules are not comprehensive enough.
Id. at 26–27. Additionally, Cravens argued that “human beings are simply not capable of
completely excluding all of their personal perspectives in their reasoning.” Id. at 27.
150. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Judging in the Quiet of the Storm, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 965, 984
(1993). Abrahamson quotes Justice Cardozo himself, who recommends that a judge “disengage
himself, so far as possible, of every influence that is personal or that comes from the particular
situation which is presented to him, and base his judicial decision on elements of an objective
nature.” Id. (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 121
(1921)); see also Cravens, supra note 73, at 4–5 (opining that the best way to ensure judges make
unbiased decisions is to require more transparency). There is no contention here that judicial
decisions can be completely divorced from the judge’s personal opinions, but without a proper rule
on which to base tacking issues there cannot be a “legally justified outcome.” Id.
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mark.151 Consistency would provide assurance that a court’s decision, in the
event of a dispute, will be grounded in established law.152
Commercial impression may differ depending on whether consumers have
been surveyed or whether the judge has made a decision based on his own
personal observations. An “eyeball” comparison153 of the old and new marks
may not accurately capture a change in commercial impression.154 For example,
consider the famous Nike swoosh that many people worldwide identify with the
Nike brand.155 If Nike was to add an element to the design, thereby complicating
the simple swoosh, a decision about whether tacking would be permitted may
differ if it was analyzed as a question of law or a question of fact. A judge
comparing the simple swoosh to the new, more complicated, swoosh might view
the two as vastly different and, therefore, not eligible for tacking. However, by
measuring the commercial impression based on consumer reaction, the swoosh
alone may have enough influence on the overall impression of the mark that
viewers may not see the added elements as important or confusing.156 A market
151. See Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in
Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2039–40 (1996).
152. Id.
153. Louangel, Inc. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1809, 1813 (S.D. Tex. 2013)
(holding that “an ‘eyeball’ comparison, alone, does not end the inquiry, as ‘the similarity of marks
depends on evidence about the perceptions of consumers in the relevant market—considerations
which an aural and visual comparison does not necessarily reveal to the full extent necessary’”
(quoting Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp. v. Freightliner Corp., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1116, 1121 (N.D.
Ill. 1998))).
154. James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 275 (7th Cir. 1976).
Individual comparison of one visual with another can be skewed by the viewer’s own unavoidable
physical attributes. Studies have shown that eight percent of men and 0.5% of women are affected
by colorblindness, many of whom are unaware that they may have some degree of this disorder.
Melinda Beck, New Outlook on Colorblindness, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 6, 2012, 12:37 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204349404578100942150867894.
Discerning different colors may not be an issue when the colors are bold, but it becomes an issue
when the colors are melded or subdued. Id. While this disorder does not affect a large population,
marketers may use services to simulate how their products and images may look to people with
different variations of colorblindness. Id. With men holding just under sixty percent of the fulltime federal judicial positions, the percentage of colorblind federal judges would be 5.7% of the
total positions held, which equates to forty-four of the 772 full-time positions. See Decades After
O’Connor, Role Of Women Judges Still Growing, THIRD BRANCH NEWS (Mar. 29, 2013),
http://news.uscourts.gov/decades-after-oconnor-role-women-judges-still-growing. Even without
colorblindness, an individual’s perception of color may depend on their sensitivity to varying
frequencies of light. CROZIER, supra note 9, at 144.
155. See W.D. Murray, supra note 146.
156. See DANESI, supra note 10, at 50. The original Nike logo was the word printed in orange
on top of the outline of a checkmark, and “this check mark is now so recognizable that the company
name itself has became [sic] superfluous.” Id. In addition, many companies rely on themes to
promote their brand, which are “cultural signs and symbols created . . . to express corporate and
brand characteristics.” See SCHMITT & SIMONSON, supra note 8, at 124. Theme elements may
consist of visuals, slogans, jingles, etc. Id. at 139. These themes are a collective of interrelated
logos and images, used repetitively in order to “embed[] [themselves] in the customer’s memory,”
which in turn trigger the associated brand. Id. at 126.
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survey might show that the two have the same continuous commercial
impression, whereas a single judge may not.
As previously established, issues of fact and law often turn on whether the
judge or jury is in the best position to make a determination on an issue.157 The
jury is in a far better position to assess commercial impression. Justice Holmes
said, “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law
to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”158 Juries consist of a diverse
mixture of the public with varying degrees of personal taste.
The
unreasonableness of allowing a single judge to make a commercial impression
decision is illuminated when considering why surveys are permitted as evidence
within the “likelihood” test.
C. Surveys Establish Impression More Accurately Than the Individual Viewer
Surveys capture actual confusion because they look to the mark’s actual
audience.159 They compile widespread opinion, and take into account different
types of market participants.160 Opinions that come directly from the
marketplace draw feedback from a larger pool and may be more accurate than
the opinion of a few people. A judge is one person, with certain visual and audial
preferences, and may be only one type of market participant. Additionally, a
judge who has been exposed to many different brands may have a very different
viewpoint on both confusion and commercial impression than a judge who is a
one-shop purchaser.
Surveys bring the test for confusion into the consumer environment where the
mark is actually utilized and out of the sterile conditions of a courtroom.
Consumers are presented with different influences when viewing trademarks,
influences that may not exist when viewing the marks in an environment so
removed from the marketplace.161 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit aptly summarized the importance of outside impressions of marks: “The
law is not made for the protection of experts, but for the public—that vast
multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who,
in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are governed by appearances
and general impressions.”162 Courts will get a more accurate view of overall

157. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
158. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
159. See supra notes 112–17 and accompanying text.
160. See Ilco Corp. v. Ideal Sec. Hardware Corp., 527 F.2d 1221, 1224 (C.C.P.A. 1976)
(opining that commercial impression should be measured by consumers and persons familiar with
the type of products the store represented).
161. James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 275 (7th Cir. 1976) (stating
that the proper analysis is the effect of the mark on a consumer’s perception in a market atmosphere
and not how it looks when placed next to the other mark, in a courtroom).
162. Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910).
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consumer reaction by surveying consumers who actually view the marks within
the marketplace.
Additionally, a judge may not be familiar with the particular good, service, or
brand that the mark represents. Therefore, the judge’s opinion about whether
confusion exists may differ from that of someone who is familiar with goods or
services within that particular market.163 Commercial impression may also vary
depending on generational differences.164 For example, logos on clothing did
not become popular until the 1970s and generations since then have become
“logo conscious.”165 A wide survey sample helps to overcome other similar
generational gaps.166 Without surveys, a judge is left to speculate as to how a
consumer might perceive a mark, and there is no guarantee that this speculation
will be accurate.167
D. The Continuous Commercial Impression Test Is Ill-Suited As a Question of
Law
Courts that measure tacking as a question of law are prone to make piecemeal
comparisons of the marks to show that the marks are dissimilar and do not create
a continuous impression.168 Comparing whether one mark has a similar element
to another is an improper method of deciding impression because the critical
measurement is the mark as a comprehensive whole, not the individual pieces of
the mark.169 Additionally, concentrating on the individual features of the mark,
163. Triangle Publ’ns v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 976 (2d Cir. 1948) (stating that the court was
hesitant to rule on likelihood of confusion as a matter of law between the magazine Seventeen and
a clothing line name “Seventeen” that was in the magazine, because no actor of the court was either
a teenager or a female).
164. See CROZIER, supra note 9, at 68–69 (“What is commonplace for one generation can look
odd or even funny to another. . . . any of these designs may become fashionable again, and look
pleasing or ‘normal.’ . . . [while] some designs seem timeless.”)
165. DANESI, supra note 10, at 19.
166. See Jones, supra note 118, at 479–80 (recognizing that surveys capture a range of
consumer opinions, such as past, present, and future consumers, as well as competitor’s purchasers,
and many others).
167. See, e.g., Caron Corp. v. V. Vivaudou, Inc., 4 F.2d 995, 997 (2d Cir. 1925) (“In all such
cases we commonly use our own eyes, and must project in imagination any possible confusions to
which a careless buyer might be subject. If there were proof of actual confusion, we could correct
our naive impressions . . . .”).
168. Cf. KeyCorp v. Key Bank & Trust, 99 F. Supp. 2d 814, 820 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (stating
that courts should not interpret marks based on the individual components of the mark).
169. Id.; see also Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 735 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating
that an identical fragment shared by both the older and newer marks by itself is not enough to meet
the tacking requirement); Homeowners Grp., Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100,
1109 (6th Cir. 1991) (explaining that “marks must be viewed in their entirety and in context,” even
though some marks may have similar pieces, each as a whole may have different commercial
impressions); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 746 F.2d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1984)
(discussing the “likelihood of confusion” test and finding that “[i]n order to determine if confusion
is likely, each trademark must be compared in its entirety; juxtaposing fragments of each mark does
not demonstrate whether the marks as a whole are confusingly similar”).
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rather than on the overall impression, may cause inconsistency when courts
apply the test, if the focus centers on the incorrect component.170 A mark is
effective if it triggers an observer to recognize the source of a product or service
it is supposed to represent.171 A mark is recognized when viewed in its entirety,
and, therefore, commercial impression should be measured in the same way.172
To suggest that the test should be completed using fragments of the mark is an
example of the court sidestepping the commercial impression analysis.
Judges erroneously supplant their own opinions about what they believe is a
mark’s commercial impression by deciding that tacking should be a question of
law. Where tacking has been decided as a question of law, courts have rejected
the opinions of legal experts as “nothing more than their own subjective
conclusions based upon their view of the trademarks themselves and not upon
anything but the most abstract principles of consumer conduct.”173 Despite
rejecting the experts’ testimony, this subjective method of analysis is essentially
the same process used by the court when ultimately relying on its own so-called
legal analysis.174
E. Inconsistencies Exist in Application Between the Tests of Confusion and
Commercial Impression
When considering “likelihood of confusion,” courts overwhelmingly have
held that they must look to the discriminating public to make a sound decision

170. See Ilco Corp. v. Ideal Sec. Hardware Corp., 527 F.2d 1221, 1225 (C.C.P.A. 1976)
(finding that, in comparing “HOME PROTECTION HARDWARE” and “HOME PROTECTION
CENTER,” the lower court erred in focusing on the first two words in each of those marks). The
court reasoned that “[b]y regarding HOME PROTECTION to be the ‘distinguishing feature’ of the
two terms which it ‘merged,’ the [TTAB] erroneously evaluated the overall commercial impression
on the basis of only a portion of the two expressions.” Id.
171. See Homeowners Grp., 931 F.2d at 1109.
172. See Spice Islands, Inc. v. Frank Tea & Spice Co., 505 F.2d 1293, 1295 (C.C.P.A. 1974)
(stating that the “paramount interest [of the court’s analysis] is not the descriptive nature of [the
mark’s elements], but the overall commercial impression derived by viewing the [two] marks in
their entireties” (footnotes omitted)).
173. Louangel, Inc. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1809, 1815 (S.D. Tex.
2013); see also Bird & Steckel, supra note 7, at 1015 (noting there was a legitimate concern with
using only expert testimony, because “[e]xpert witnesses can testify about their beliefs regarding
confusion, but such testimony may not represent the consumer’s state of mind and can devolve into
a ‘battle of the experts’ between hired guns paid to support a particular position”). There is also a
concern that expert witnesses’ opinions on visual similarities “represent only a fraction of what
consumers might discern in order to determine whether a trademark comes from a particular
source.” Id.
174. Louangel, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812 (referring to the test of comparing the marks
and determining commercial impression as “in essence an ‘eyeball’ test”). This kind of subjective
reasoning is discouraged within judicial decisions, as “the exercise of judicial power is not
legitimate if it is based on a judge’s personal preferences rather than law that precedes the case, on
subjective will rather than objective analysis, on emotion rather than reasoned reflection.” Paul
Gewirtz, On “I Know It When I See It”, 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1025 (1996).
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about whether confusion actually exists.175 Despite the higher standard,176 the
commercial impression test for tacking should look to the public as well. Courts
deciding the tacking issue as a matter of law have declined to do so, despite the
similarities between the two tests.177
The two factors of the “likelihood” test that are most similar to the test of
commercial impression are the visual “similarit[ies] of the marks” and “evidence
of actual confusion.”178 These two factors focus on ordinary consumer
perception of the marks, which is evidence that is essential to determine whether
a continuous commercial impression exists.179 Further, courts have found that
the measurement of similarity “must be compared in [] light of what occurs in
the marketplace, not in the courtroom.”180 To do otherwise would be to
speculate on how consumers will react to a mark, which creates neither
consistent decisions nor well-reasoned ones.181
Courts that have determined the “likelihood” test to be a mixed question of
law and fact have relied on both the similarity and actual confusion factors.182
In Data Concepts, the Sixth Circuit held that tacking was a question of law, but
the “likelihood” factors were factual issues the appellate court could only review
for clear error.183 The court found that balancing these factors was a legal
issue.184 The Sixth Circuit also determined that the lower court erred by
justifying its own tacking decision by comparing the marks side-by-side.185 The
majority chastised the lower court for not considering the mark “in light of what
occurs in the marketplace, whether the mark will be confusing to the public when
singly presented.”186
These two holdings within the same circuit are inconsistent. Each test looks
to the commercial market, but only the “likelihood” test actually requires
evidence from that market. Using this test for “likelihood” but not looking to
175. See supra note 159.
176. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
177. See supra Part II.C (noting how the court, when examining tacking as a matter of law,
chose not to evaluate consumer protection); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
178. Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 624 (6th Cir. 1998).
179. See Louangel, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812 (quoting 1 ANNE GILSON LALONDE,
GIBSON ON TRADEMARKS, § 3.03(g)(i) (Matthew Bender & Co. 2012)).
180. James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 275 (7th Cir. 1976) (noting
that this comparison is important in pinpointing the “likelihood of confusion”).
181. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
182. Data Concepts, 150 F.3d at 624.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 626; see also James Burrough, 540 F.2d at 275 (holding that a side-by-side
comparison of marks is not the proper method of analyzing differences when determining
“likelihood of confusion,” because the public will unlikely be presented with the marks in that
way).
186. Data Concepts, 150 F.3d at 626 (quoting Homeowners Grp., Inc. v. Home Mktg.
Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1109 (6th Cir. 1991)).
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the same sources when considering tacking is inconsistent with determining
actual consumer impression. It is contradictory to find that the factors in one
test could be considered a factual issue, but that a test that focuses on the same
elements should be considered a legal issue in an analogous situation.
III. MEASURING COMMERCIAL IMPRESSION AS A QUESTION OF FACT AIDS IN
PRODUCING CONSISTENT JUDICIAL OUTCOMES AND LENDS ITSELF TO THE
NATURE OF VARIED CONSUMER PERCEPTION
Because the touchstone of tacking is commercial impression, it would be
illogical, given current trademark jurisprudence, to measure tacking as a
question of law. The problem with measuring tacking as a question of law arises
from the nature of attempting to determine the kind of impression a visual or
aural design makes on an individual consumer. The problem is not just that
consumer impression is ill-suited to being a question of law, but rather the issue
is that there is no proper guidance on how continuous commercial impression
should be defined.187 Determining tacking as a question of fact is difficult
without a test that establishes the necessary factual requirements, but there is
some guidance on what those factors should be.188 Related precedent has not
established a clear test for analyzing tacking as a question of law.189
In order to weigh the complexity of interpreting trademarks, the proper test
for continuous commercial impression should be a question of fact that consists
of specific prongs that mirror the “likelihood of confusion” test. An additional
requirement should be an analysis of what the mark signifies, such as whether
the underlying source represented by the mark has been altered significantly.190
This directs the overall analysis towards a concrete application and away from
the current undefined continuous commercial impression test.
Images have a complex impact on the viewer; therefore, continuing
commercial impression should not be a question of law. The commercial
impression test needs clear boundaries, because without them the courts are free
to make unstandardized decisions and mislabel their analyses as questions of
law. The foundation for the proper analysis is found in the “likelihood of
187. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (recognizing that there is no standard tacking
test).
188. See, e.g., Quiksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749, 759–60 (9th Cir. 2006)
(permitting testimony from those familiar with the mark); Louangel, Inc. v. Darden Rests., Inc.,
106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1809, 1812 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (referencing consumer perceptions of the
mark); Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp. v. Freightliner Corp., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1116, 1121 (N.D.
Ill. 1998) (mentioning the lack of a test, while demonstrating that it is appropriate to avoid purely
visual comparisons of the marks).
189. See Mark & Jacoby, supra note 6, at 440 (indicating that there is no test for tacking similar
to the “likelihood of confusion” test).
190. See, e.g., Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 1159 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (indicating that a later mark should not vary from what was attempted to be tacked); KeyCorp
v. Key Bank & Trust, 99 F. Supp. 2d 814, 820 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (considering whether tacking
should be allowed where “two marks are used to signify two entirely different legal entities”).
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confusion” test. Determining this similar issue involves using data from the
marketplace to conclude how viewers of marks react to those images. An
accurate measurement of commercial impression for tacking purposes can be
gathered from the same pool of data. The use of surveys and other evidence that
help determine actual commercial impression is a step towards defining the test
and fostering consistency. One commentator suggests that consistency can be
achieved by moving to a more fact-based assessment, noting “that a root cause
of the problem is the failure to adequately assess continuing commercial
impression from the perspective of the consumer.”191 In turn, consistency would
give potential litigants initial guidance regarding whether judicial action is
appropriate.192
Viewing tacking as a strict question of fact would clarify how these issues
should be treated on appellate review. Although measuring tacking as a mixed
question of law and fact is a step in the right direction, the proper standard of
review on appeal may still be disputed. Mixed questions of law and fact should
generally be used when the law is agreed upon, when the facts are undisputed,
and when questioning whether the law was properly applied to the available
facts.193 There is a strong argument that the legal standard for tacking is still
undecided. While courts apply the notion of continuous commercial impression,
no clear definition exists. In order to consider tacking a mixed question a clear
definition and test should be agreed upon. Using the three-prong test taken from
the “likelihood of confusion” analysis, courts will be provided a consistent
standard to decide tacking cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
Trademarks exist for source identification in the marketplace and the way
tacking is measured should further that purpose. Measuring continuous
commercial impression as a question of law is inconsistent with the inherent
nature of the design and the identification purpose of the mark. Accurate
measurement of commercial impression should be demonstrated by evidence of
consumer reaction. Deciding tacking as a question of fact and incorporating
evidence of actual consumer impressions brings consistency and accuracy to the
tacking test. Furthermore, this approach harmonizes the tacking analysis with
other analogous trademark assessments. Permitting judges to decide tacking as
a matter of law allows judges to speculate about how others would view the
mark. Such a subjective review is a poor legal standard.

191. See Mark & Jacoby, supra note 6, at 448 (noting that it should be assessed from the
viewpoint of a consumer and evaluating it as both a “question of fact and law”).
192. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
193. ROBERT E. LARSEN, NAVIGATING THE FEDERAL TRIAL § 14:18 (2014).
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